Employees in California are protected by the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) which governs “compensation given to California employees for injuries incurred in the course and scope of their employment.” Charles J. Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810. All employers except the state must secure the payments of compensation by either carrying workers’ compensation insurance or self-insuring. In a recent case, the San Mountain Empire School District was self-insured, but had also contracted for excess policy insurance. In the case of the Mountain Empire School District, its excess insurer ran out of money.

California law also provides for protection to both “insured and the public” through a system called the California Insurance Guarantee Association (CIGA). Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 101, 111-112. CIGA pays only: 1) covered claims and 2) claims for which neither a solvent insurer or self-insured employer is jointly and severally liable.

 By: Julia M. Wei and Josue Uribe Fonseca

In a purchase and sale context, California law requires the seller of residential real estate to disclose material facts affecting the value or desirability of the property, “if it is known that such facts are not known to or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of a buyer.” Calemine v. Samuelson, 171 Cal. App. 4th 153, 161-62 (2009). A fact is material if it has an effect on the value or desirability of the property. Alfaro v. Cmty. Hous. Improvement Sys. & Planning Ass'n, Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1356, 1382 (2009).

However, as a residential landlord, the disclosure requirements to tenants are less broad and largely controlled by state law with mandated disclosures such as the Mold Addendum and the Bedbug Addendum.

There is very little law on point for landlord’s duties to disclose in a residential leasing context. This is likely due to the fact that the California Civil Code provides numerous protections for the residential tenant, such as their right to repair and deduct.

Recently in the news we have seen articles about people traveling with their miniature horses or their pigs. Perhaps you may be wondering why is the airline permitting the miniature horse on the plane? The answer breaks down like this: if it is a miniature horse, it is likely a service animal and if it is a pig, it is likely an emotional support animal.

Here is what the ADA says about Miniature Horses:

“In addition to the provisions about service dogs, the Department’s revised ADA regulations have a new, separate provision about miniature horses that have been individually trained to do work or perform tasks for people with disabilities. (Miniature horses generally range in height from 24 inches to 34 inches measured to the shoulders and generally weigh between 70 and 100 pounds.) Entities covered by the ADA must modify their policies to permit miniature horses where reasonable. The regulations set out four assessment factors to assist entities in determining whether miniature horses can be accommodated in their facility. The assessment factors are (1) whether the miniature horse is housebroken; (2) whether the miniature horse is under the owner’s control; (3) whether the facility can accommodate the miniature horse’s type, size, and weight; and (4) whether the miniature horse’s presence will not compromise legitimate safety requirements necessary for safe operation of the facility.”

In California, a landowner has no enforceable property rights to an unobstructed view. That means, you can’t force your downhill neighbor to trim their trees. However, I have seen the occasional CC&R’s from planned communities that restrict heights of trees, plantings, and structures to ensure that the homeowners can enjoy their view.In those circumstances, the restrictive covenants are strictly construed against the person seeking to enforce them. American jurisprudence favors alienability and free use of land so that will be the default legal view.

In the recent case of Eisen v. Tavangarian, the appellate court evaluated the CC&R language governing lots in the posh Marquez Knolls area in Pacific Palisades, California. The properties are nestled in the hills in this exclusive community overlooking Los Angeles and the Pacific Ocean. The homes are likely valued in excess of $4 million and accordingly the view of the ocean no doubt has some impact on the high property values.

In a recent opinion, the California Court of Appeal found that after foreclosure, all of the borrower’s leases (and its waivers) were assigned to the lender, and therefore unavailable as a defense to the former owner against a creditor. Therefore, the judgment creditor was successfully able to add two new parties to the judgment as the limitation the lease no longer shielded them.

Yolanda’s Inc. owns and operates restaurants. Yolanda entered into a lease to operate a restaurant at the Seabridge shopping center in Oxnard, California. The landlord K&G and Rocklin and its real estate broker KGCRE failed to inform the tenant that they were in negotiations to lease another space in the shopping center to the gym. The gym’s customers used all the parking spaces, resulting in loss of business for Yolanda’s. Yolanda’s prevailed in its lawsuit against the landlord, alleging among other causes of action, fraud and breach of lease. Yolanda obtained a judgment in the amount of almost 2 million dollars, plus another nearly half a million dollars in attorneys’ fees and costs.

In the recent case of Southern California Edison Company v. Severns, the written easement described a 4 foot wide easement for the placement of five electrical power poles. The instrument went on further to provide that the grantee should have “free access” to maintain the electrical equipment. This created dispute between the grantor and the utility company because of the unspecified routes the utility company would take on the grantor’s property to access the easement. The court determined that the easement was in fact a “floating easement”.

California’s Fourth Appellate District came down with an unsurprising opinion that because a real estate broker has a duty to their principal to share information he or she possesses that will adversely affect the value of her property, an expert opinion is not required to establish breach of that duty.

The Ryans listed their La Jolla California property with Sotheby’s. During one of the open houses, the listing agent learned from the neighbor that a major remodel was planned on the neighboring property that would obstruct the Ryan’s ocean view. The Ryan’s agent failed to inform the Ryans and subsequently when the Ryan’s sold the property the listing agent failed to inform the buyers. When the buyers learned that the $3.86 million home that they had just purchased was about to lose its ocean view and be subject to two years of construction next door, they unsurprisingly sought rescission of the purchase. 

Continuing the trend in California caselaw, an appellate court concluded that no, the trustee does not have duties beyond the deed of trust itself and the governing statutes.

California property developer citrus El Dorado LLC owed its lenders over $20 million in late 2014. Unsurprisingly, its lender Stearns Bank instructed the trustee, Chicago Title Company, to conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the real property secured by the deed of trust.

It is well-settled California law that land owners are required to maintain land in their possession and control in a reasonably safe condition. California courts look to what are called the “Rowland factors” to evaluate if a duty is owed beyond the principles of Civil Code section 1714:

• the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff
• the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury
• the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and injury suffered
• the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct
• the policy of preventing future harm
• the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.[1]

In the recent case of Williams v. Fremont Corners Inc., The Sixth Appellate District found that the defendant shopping center had no duty to take affirmative measures beyond those already found in the record to discover criminal activity on the premises.

In the recent case of RANCH AT THE FALLS, LLC v. Keith O’Neal et al., a ranch owner tried to establish prescriptive or equitable easement rights along private roads to reach her ranch. Ms. Hart prevailed at the trial court level but was not so fortunate on appeal. California’s second Appellate District concluded that Ms. Hart had failed to meet the hostility requirement to establish prescriptive easement.

Ms. Hart use the private roads from 2002 until 2012. However because Ms. Hart also owned several properties within the homeowners associations named in the lawsuit, she was personally entitled to use the private streets of the communities. The court cited Witkin, noting “Prescription cannot be gained if the use is permissive.”

The Ninth Circuit has expanded the scope of claims that are subject to arbitration clauses to include racial discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Lambert v. Tesla, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 14591.

In 2015, DeWitt Lambert, who is African American, began working as a production associate in Tesla’s Fremont, California factory. He claimed that during his employment other employees consistently harassed him and that he was not promoted because of his race. Lambert alleged that his complaints to human resources went nowhere.

In a case of first impression, the Second Appellate District concluded that assuming fraudulent intent, the UVTA (formerly the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act) applies to premarital agreements which treat after marriage earnings and assets as separate property.

In 2005, Judgment Creditor Robert Strum obtained a $600k bankruptcy judgment against debtor Todd Moyer. The creditor renewed the judgment and conducted a number of debtor’s examinations. Upon an OEX in 2016, the creditor learned that the debtor married in 2014 and identified Sturm’s judgment as an exhibit to a premarital agreement.

We are still seeing the effects of the subprime meltdown ripple through the appellate courts. In the case of Taniguchi v. Restoration Homes, what appears on first blush to be a straight forward analysis that under California law borrowers can stop a foreclosure sale by reinstating the loan had a twist.

The Taniguchis own a home in San Mateo County and in 2006, they borrowed $510k. They missed 4 loan payments in 2013, and normally to cure the default with the lender, the borrowers would simply need to reinstate the 4 missed payments and late charges under the promissory note.  Here's the twist back in 2009, the Taniguchis entered into a loan modification that adjusted the principal amount, reduced the interest rate and monthly payments, and deferred until the maturity of the approximately $116k (including accrued and unpaid interest and principal, fees, and foreclosure expenses).

U.C.C Section 9-319(a) grants a consignee ownership rights in consigned goods. Does it also apply to proceeds from the sale of those goods? In the recent decision of In Re Pettit Oil Company, the Ninth Circuit said that it does, holding that proceeds from goods held by a consignee at the time of a bankruptcy filing are subject to the perfection and priority rules in the Bankruptcy Code.

This week the Supreme Court issued their opinion in Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP. In 2007, Obduskey bought a house in Colorado, borrowed $330k from a lender and secured repayment of the loan with a mortgage (or deed of trust) against the house. In 2014, Wells Fargo hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to commence foreclosure as the borrower was in default.

The firm sent a letter to borrower as required under state law to commence the foreclosure. The opinion did not publish the text of that initial letter but I suspect it contained a “mini Miranda” which is common in demand letters, ie, that this could be considered an attempt to collect a debt under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. (“FDCPA”). The borrower disputed the debt and invoked section 1692g)b of the FDCPA which would require a debt collection to cease collection until it obtains verification of the debt.

One California Appellate Court Grants Marin County Neighbor Irrevocable Parol License But Denies Equitable Easement. Another Denies The Accommodation of a Trivial Expense.

by Julia M. Wei, Esq. and Alexander J. Lewicki, Esq.

Neighbor disputes over shared boundaries can arise over a misplaced fence, a shared driveway, or water rights. These claims are heavily fact-based and often the accuracy of the modern survey can only be overcome with meeting the elements for adverse possession or prescriptive easement.

In recent decades California courts have fashioned various remedies instead, such as the equitable easement and even the “irrevocable parol license” over someone else’s property.

A new ruling from California’s 6th Appellate District clarifies what appeared to be a gap in what is permitted for post-judgment document discovery on third parties.

California’s Enforcement of Judgment laws (enumerated in the California Code of Civil Procedure)+ §680.010 et seq.) has very clear code sections on what is allowed for discovery of the judgment debtor:

1. the judgment creditor may propound interrogatories (§708.020), and may seek production of judgment debtor’s financial records (§708.030); and
2. the judgment creditor may take the debtor’s examination (§708.110) “The judgment creditor may apply to the proper court for an order requiring the judgment debtor to appear before the court, or before a referee appointed by the court, at a time and place specified in the order, to furnish information to aid in enforcement of the money judgment.”

The United States Department of Labor issued new regulations today affecting the white collar exemptions to the overtime wage and hour laws under FLSA. (The Fair Labor Standards Act.) DOL apparently set a new threshold amount for claiming the exemption. Workers must now make $35,308 per year in order to claim any of the white collar exemptions. The effect of the new overtime rules, issued today, March 7, 2019, is unclear as a number of groups have indicated that they intend to take legal actions related to these new regulations.

[DOL’s Fact Sheet here: https://www.dol.gov/whd/overtime/fs17a_overview.htm]

Diemer & Wei, LLP routinely represents employers related to wage and hour claims. Please call if you need legal advice about this type of matter, or are concerned about how the new rules might affect your business operations.

The California Corporations Code requires founders to follow specific procedures and file specific forms before the entity comes into existence. For example, articles of incorporation must be filed with the Secretary of State in order to create a corporation. In contrast, a general partnership can be formed without any document at all.

A partnership is formed when two or more individuals co-own a business for profit. Cal. Corp. § 16101 (9). No writing at all is required to form a partnership. However, written partnership agreements are often created by the partners and this article discusses one reason why a partnership agreement is important.

For example, Sallie and Juan open a bakery shop together in downtown San Jose. Sallie buys all the groceries, pays for them and hires the staff. Juan gets up early, bakes everything and stocks the display windows. Together Sallie and Juan help customers and man the cash register. At the end of each day, they split the proceeds after costs are paid. They are clearly doing business together in their San Jose bakery. Even without a written partnership agreement or the intent to form a partnership, they have.

However, one day Sallie tells Juan that she has to move out of state to care for an elderly relative. Sallie leaves San Jose for Reno the next day. Juan no longer has a partner.

After the subprime meltdown, sweeping legislation was enacted in an effort to protect Californian homeowners. HBOR cases have since trickled in over the last seven years with a new one regarding fees for borrowers who successfully halt a foreclosure sale with a temporary restraining order.

1.  A Prevailing Borrower Is Entitled to Attorney’s Fees After Obtaining a Temporary Restraining Order.

After the Monterossa case in 2015 which held that HBOR provided for award of attorney fees and costs when a preliminary injunction issues, it was logical to then wonder if the same would apply after the borrower obtains a TRO. A TRO is an early court order, one that is obtained on a one day ex-parte notice. It is often difficult for a loan servicer or lender to mobilize in time to oppose a temporary restraining order.